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ANNEX: 
ARREST WARRANT OF 11 APRIL 2000 
(DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF 
THE CONGO V. BELGIUM)l 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
14 FEBRUARY 2002 
SUMMARY OF THE JUDGMENT2 
HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND SUBMISSIONS OF THE 
PARTIES (PARAS. 1-12) 
The Court recalls that on 17 October 2000 the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (hereinafter "the Congo") filed in the Registry of the Court an 
Application instituting proceedings against the Kingdom of Belgium 
(hereinafter "Belgium") in respect of a dispute concerning an 
"international arrest warrant issued on 11 April 2000 by a Belgian 
investigating judge ... against the Minister for Foreign Affairs in office 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia 
Ndombasi". 
In that Application the Congo contended that Belgium had violated the 
"principle that a State may not exercise its authority on the territory of 
I. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 2002 
I.C.J. (Feb. 14) available at http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idecisions.htm. 
2. Press Release 2002l04bis, International Court of Justice, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 
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another State", the "principle of sovereign equality among all Members 
of the United Nations, as laid down in Article 2, paragraph 1, of the 
Charter of the United Nations", as well as "the diplomatic immunity of 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a sovereign State, as recognized by 
the jurisprudence of the Court and following from Article 41, paragraph 
2, of the Vienna Convention of 18 April 1961 on Diplomatic Relations". 
In order to found the Court's jurisdiction the Congo invoked in the 
aforementioned Application the fact that "Belgium ha[ d) accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court and, in so far as may be required, the 
[aforementioned) Application signifie[d] acceptance of that jurisdiction 
by the Democratic Republic of the Congo". 
The Court further recalls that on the same day, the Congo also filed a 
request for the indication of a provisional measure; and that by an Order 
of 8 December 2000 the Court, on the one hand, rejected Belgium's 
request that the case be removed from the List and, on the other, held that 
the circumstances, as they then presented themselves to the Court, were 
not such as to require the exercise of its power under Article 41 of the 
Statute to indicate provisional measures. In the same Order, the Court 
also held that "it [was] desirable that the issues before the Court should 
be determined as soon as possible" and that "it [was] therefore 
appropriate to ensure that a decision on the Congo's Application be 
reached with all expedition". 
By Order of 13 December 2000, the President of the Court, taking 
account of the agreement of the Parties as expressed at a meeting held 
with their Agents on 8 December 2000, fixed time-limits for the filing of 
a Memorial by the Congo and of a Counter-Memorial. by Belgium, 
addressing both issues of jurisdiction and admissibility and the merits. 
After the pleadings had been filed within the time-limits as subsequently 
extended, public hearings were held from 15 to 19 October 2001. 
At the oral proceedings, the following final submissions were presented 
by the Parties: 
On behalf of the Government of the Congo, 
"In light of the facts and arguments set out during the written and 
oral proceedings, the Government of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo requests the Court to adjudge and declare that: 
by issuing and internationally circulating the arrest warrant of 11 
April 2000 against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, Belgium 
2
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committed a violation in regard to the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo of the rule of customary international law concerning 
the absolute inviolability and immunity from criminal process of 
incumbent foreign ministers; in so doing, it violated the principle 
of sovereign equality among States; 
a formal finding by the Court of the unlawfulness of that act 
constitutes an appropriate form of satisfaction, providing 
reparation for the consequent moral injury to the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo; 
the violations of international law underlying the issue and 
international circulation of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 
preclude any State, including Belgium, from executing it; 
Belgium shall be required to recall and cancel the arrest warrant 
of 11 April 2000 and to inform the foreign authorities to whom 
the warrant was circulated that Belgium renounces its request for 
their co-operation in executing the unlawful warrant." 
On behalf of the Government of Belgium, 
"For the reasons stated in the Counter-Memorial of Belgium and 
in its oral submissions, Belgium requests the Court, as a 
preliminary matter, to adjudge and declare that the Court lacks 
jurisdiction in this case and/or that the Application by the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo against Belgium is 
inadmissible. 
If, contrary to the submissions of Belgium with regard to the 
Court's jurisdiction and the admissibility of the Application, the 
Court concludes that it does have jurisdiction in this case and 
that the Application by the Democratic Republic of the Congo is 
admissible, Belgium requests the Court to reject the submissions 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the merits of the 
case and to dismiss the Application." 
BACKGROUND TO THE CASE (PARAS. 13-21) 
153 
On 11 April 2000 an investigating judge of the Brussels tribunal de 
premiere instance issued "an international arrest warrant in absentia" 
against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, charging him, as perpetrator or 
co-perpetrator, with offences constituting grave breaches of the Geneva 
3
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Conventions of 1949 and of the Additional Protocols thereto, and with 
crimes against humanity. The arrest warrant was circulated 
internationally through Interpol. 
At the time when the arrest warrant was issued Mr. Yerodia was the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo . 
• 
The crimes with which Mr. Yerodia was charged were punishable in 
Belgium under the Law of 16 June 1993 "concerning the Punishment of 
Grave Breaches of the International Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 and of Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977 Additional Thereto", as 
amended by the Law of 19 February 1999 "concerning the Punishment 
of Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law" (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Belgian Law"). 
On 17 October 2000, the Congo instituted proceedings before the 
International Court of Justice, requesting the Court "to declare that the 
Kingdom of Belgium shall annul the international arrest warrant issued 
on 11 April 2000". After the proceedings were instituted, Mr. Yerodia 
ceased to hold office as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and subsequently 
ceased to hold any ministerial office. 
In its Application instituting proceedings, the Congo relied on two 
separate legal grounds. First, it claimed that "[t]he universal jurisdiction 
that the Belgian State attributes to itself under Article 7 of the Law in 
question" constituted a "[v]iolation of the principle that a State may not 
exercise its authority on the territory of another State and of the principle 
of sovereign equality among all Members of the United Nations". 
Secondly, it claimed that "[t]he non-recognition, on the basis of Article 5 
... of the Belgian Law, of the immunity of a Minister for Foreign Affairs 
in office" constituted a "[v ]iolation of the diplomatic immunity of the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of a sovereign State". However, the Congo's 
Memorial and its final submissions refer only to a violation "in regard to 
the . . . Congo of the rule of customary international law concerning the 
absolute inviolability and immunity from criminal process of incumbent 
foreign ministers". 
4
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OBJECTIONS OF BELGIUM RELATING TO JURISDICTION, 
MOOTNESS AND ADMISSffiILITY (PARAS. 22-44) 
BELGIUM'S FIRST OBJECTION (PARAS. 23-28) 
155 
The Court begins by considering the first objection presented by 
Belgium, which reads as follows: 
"That, in the light of the fact that Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi is no 
longer either Minister for Foreign Affairs of the [Congo] or a 
minister occupying any other position in the ... Government [of 
the Congo], there is no longer a 'legal dispute' between the 
Parties within the meaning of this term in the Optional Clause 
Declarations of the Parties and that the Court accordingly lacks 
jurisdiction in this case." 
The Court recalls that, according to its settled jurisprudence, its 
jurisdiction must be determined at the time that the act instituting 
proceedings was ftled. Thus, if the Court has jurisdiction on the date the 
case is referred to it, it continues to do so regardless of subsequent 
events. Such events might lead to a finding that an application has 
subsequently become moot and to a decision not to proceed to judgment 
on the merits, but they cannot deprive the Court of jurisdiction. 
The Court then finds that, on the date that the Congo's Application 
instituting these proceedings was ftled, each of the Parties was bound by 
a declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction, ftled in 
accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court: 
Belgium by a declaration of 17 June 1958 and the Congo by a 
declaration of 8 February 1989. Those declarations contained no 
reservation applicable to the present case. The Court further observes 
that it is, moreover, not contested by the Parties that at the material time 
there was a legal dispute between them concerning the international 
lawfulness of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 and the consequences 
to be drawn if the warrant was unlawful. The Court accordingly 
concludes that at the time that it was seised of the case it had jurisdiction 
to deal with it, and that it still has such jurisdiction, and that Belgium's 
first objection must therefore be rejected. 
BELGIUM'S SECOND OBJECTION (PARAS. 29-32) 
The second objection presented by Belgium is the following: 
5
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"That in the light of the fact that Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi is no 
longer either Minister for Foreign Affairs of the [Congo] or a 
minister occupying any other position in the ... Government [of 
the Congo], the case is now without object and the Court should 
accordingly decline to proceed to judgment on the merits of the 
case." 
The Court notes that it has already affIrmed on a number of occasions 
that events occurring subsequent to the filing of an application may 
render the application without object such that the Court is not called 
upon to give a decision thereon. However, the Court considers that this is 
not such a case. It fInds that the change which has occurred in the 
situation of Mr. Yerodia has not in fact put an end to the dispute between 
the Parties and has not deprived the Application of its object. The Congo 
argues that the arrest warrant issued by the Belgian judicial authorities 
against Mr. Yerodia was and remains unlawful. It asks the Court to hold 
that the warrant is unlawful, thus providing redress for the moral injury 
which the warrant allegedly caused to it. The Congo also continues to 
seek the cancellation of the warrant. For its part, Belgium contends that it 
did not act in violation of international law and it disputes the Congo's 
submissions. In the view of the Court, it follows from the foregoing that 
the Application of the Congo is not now without object and that 
accordingly the case is not moot. Belgium's second objection is 
accordingly rejected. 
BELGIUM'S THIRD OBJECTION (PARAS. 33-36) 
The third Belgian objection is put as follows: 
"That the case as it now stands is materially different to that set 
out in the [Congo]'s Application instituting proceedings and that 
the Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction in the case and/or that 
the application is inadmissible." 
The Court notes that, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, it 
"cannot, in principle, allow a dispute brought before it by application to 
be transformed by amendments in the submissions into another dispute 
which is different in character". However, the Court considers that in the 
present case the facts underlying the Application have not changed in a 
way that produced such a transformation in the dispute brought before it. 
The question submitted to the Court for decision remains whether the 
issue and circulation of the arrest warrant by the Belgian judicial 
authorities against a person who was at that time the Minister for Foreign 
6
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Affairs of the Congo were contrary to international law. The Congo's 
final submissions arise "directly out of the question which is the subject-
matter of that Application". In these circumstances, the Court considers 
that Belgium cannot validly maintain that the dispute brought before the 
Court was transformed in a way that affected its ability to prepare its 
defence, or that the requirements of the sound administration of justice 
were infringed. Belgium's third objection is accordingly rejected. 
BELGIUM'S FOURTH OBJECTION (PARAS. 37-40) 
The fourth Belgian objection reads as follows: 
"That, in the light of the new circumstances concerning Mr. 
Yerodia Ndombasi, the case has assumed the character of an 
action of diplomatic protection but one in which the individual 
being protected has failed to exhaust local remedies, and that the 
Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction in the case and/or that the 
application is inadmissible." 
The Court notes that the Congo has never sought to invoke before it Mr. 
Yerodia's personal rights. It considers that, despite the change in 
professional situation of Mr. Yerodia, the character of the dispute 
submitted to the Court by means of the Application has not changed: the 
dispute still concerns the lawfulness of the arrest warrant issued on 11 
April 2000 against a person who was at the time Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Congo, and the question whether the rights of the Congo 
have or have not been violated by that warrant. The Court finds that, as 
the Congo is not acting in the context of protection of one of its 
nationals, Belgium cannot rely upon the rules relating to the exhaustion 
of local remedies. 
In any event, the Court recalls that an objection based on non-exhaustion 
of local remedies relates to the admissibility of the application. Under 
settled jurisprudence, the critical date for determining the admissibility of 
an application is the date on which it is filed. Belgium accepts that, on 
the date on which the Congo filed the Application instituting 
proceedings, the Congo had a direct legal interest in the matter, and was 
asserting a claim in its own name. Belgium's fourth objection is 
accordingly rejected. 
7
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BELGIUM'S SUBSIDIARY ARGUMENT CONCERNING THE NON ULTRA 
PETITA RULE (PARAS. 41-43) 
As a subsidiary argument, Belgium further contends that "[i]n the event 
that the Court decides that it does have jurisdiction in this case and that 
the application is admissible, ... the non ultra petita rule operates to limit 
the jurisdiction of the Court to those issues that are the subject of the 
[Congo]' s final submissions". 
Belgium points out that the Congo initially advanced a twofold 
argument, based, on the one hand, on the Belgian judge's lack of 
jurisdiction and, on the other, on the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed 
by its Minister for Foreign Affairs. According to Belgium, the Congo 
now confines itself to arguing the latter point, and the Court 
consequently cannot rule on the issue of universal jurisdiction in any 
decision it renders on the merits of the case. 
The Court recalls the well-established principle that "it is the duty of the 
Court not only to reply to the questions as stated in the final submissions 
of the parties, but also to abstain from deciding points not included in 
those submissions" The Court observes that, while it is thus not entitled 
to decide upon questions not asked of it, the non ultra petita rule 
nonetheless cannot preclude the Court from addressing certain legal 
points in its reasoning. Thus in the present case the Court may not rule, 
in the operative part of its Judgment, on the question whether the 
disputed arrest warrant, issued by the Belgian investigating judge in 
exercise of his purported universal jurisdiction, complied in that regard 
with the rules and principles of international law governing the 
jurisdiction of national courts. This does not mean, however, that the 
Court may not deal with certain aspects of that question in the reasoning 
of its Judgment, should it deem this necessary or desirable. 
MERITS OF THE CASE (PARAS. 45-71) 
As indicated above, in its Application instituting these proceedings, the 
Congo originally challenged the legality of the arrest warrant of 11 April 
2000 on two separate grounds: on the one hand, Belgium's claim to 
exercise a universal jurisdiction and, on the other, the alleged violation of 
the immunities of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo then in 
office. However, in its submissions in its Memorial, and in its final 
submissions at the close of the oral proceedings, the Congo invokes only 
the latter ground. 
8
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The Court observes that, as a matter of logic, the second ground should 
be addressed only once there has been a determination in respect of the 
first, since it is only where a State has jurisdiction under international 
law in relation to a particular matter that there can be any question of 
immunities in regard to the exercise of that jurisdiction. However, in the 
present case, and in view of the final form of the Congo's submissions, 
the Court first addresses the question whether, assuming that it had 
jurisdiction under international law to issue and circulate the arrest 
warrant of 11 April 2000, Belgium in so doing violated the immunities of 
the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo .. 
IMMUNITY AND INVIOLABILITY OF AN INCUMBENT FOREIGN MINISTER 
IN GENERAL (PARAS. 47-55) 
The Court observes at the outset that in international law it is firmly 
established that, as also diplomatic and consular agents,· certain holders 
of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of 
Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from 
jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal. For the purposes of 
the present case, it is only the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and 
the inviolability of an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs that fall for 
the Court to consider. 
The Court notes that a certain number of treaty instruments were cited by 
the Parties in this regard, including the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961 and the New York Convention on 
Special Missions of 8 December 1969. The Court finds that these 
conventions provide useful guidance on certain aspects of the question of 
immunities, but that they do not contain any provision specifically 
defining the immunities enjoyed by Ministers for Foreign Affairs. It is 
consequently on the basis of customary international law that the Court 
must decide the questions relating to the immunities of such Ministers 
raised in the present case. 
In customary international law, the immunities accorded to Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs are not granted for their personal benefit, but to ensure 
the effective performance of their functions on behalf of their respective 
States. In order to determine the extent of these immunities, the Court 
must therefore first consider the nature of the functions exercised by a 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. After an examination of those functions, the 
Court concludes that they are such that, throughout the duration of his or 
her office, a Minister for Foreign Affairs when abroad enjoys full 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. That immunity 
9
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and that inviolability protect the individual concerned against any act of 
authority of another State which would hinder him or her, in the 
performance of his or her duties. 
The Court finds that in this respect no distinction can be drawn between 
acts performed by a Minister for Foreign Affairs in an "official" capacity 
and those claimed to have been performed in a "private capacity", or, for 
that matter, between acts performed before the person concerned 
assumed office as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acts committed 
during the period of office. Thus, if a Minister for Foreign Affairs is 
arrested in another State on a criminal charge, he or she is clearly thereby 
prevented from exercising the functions of his or her office. Furthermore, 
even the mere risk that, by travelling to or transiting another State, a 
Minister for Foreign Affairs might be exposing himself or herself to legal 
proceedings could deter the Minister from travelling internationally when 
required to do so for the purposes of the performance of his or her 
official functions. 
The Court then addresses Belgium's argument that immunities accorded 
to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs can in no case protect them 
where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes 
against humanity. 
The Court states that it has carefully examined State practice, including 
national legislation and those few decisions of national higher courts, 
such as the House of Lords in the United Kingdom or the French Court 
of Cassation, and that it has been unable to deduce from this practice that 
there exists under customary international law any form of exception to 
the rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability 
to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected of 
having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Court 
adds that it has also examined the rules concerning the immunity or 
criminal responsibility of persons having an official capacity contained 
in the legal instruments creating international criminal tribunals, and 
which are specifically applicable to the latter (see Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, Art. 7; Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal of Tokyo, Art. 6; Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Art. 7, para. 
2; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 6, 
para. 2; Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 27), and that it 
finds that these rules likewise do not enable it to conclude that any such 
exception exists in customary international law in regard to national 
courts. Finally, the Court observes that none of the decisions of the 
10
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Nuremberg and Tokyo international military tribunals, or of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, cited by 
Belgium deal with the question of the immunities of incumbent Ministers 
for Foreign Affairs before national courts where they are accused of 
having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Court 
accordingly notes that those decisions are in no way at variance with the 
findings it has reached above. The Court accordingly does not accept 
Belgium's argument in this regard. 
It further notes that the rules governing the jurisdiction of national courts 
must be carefully distinguished from those governing jurisdictional 
immunities: jurisdiction does not imply absence of immunity, while 
absence of immunity does not imply jurisdiction. Thus, although various 
international conventions on the prevention and punishment of certain 
serious crimes impose on States obligations of prosecution or extradition, 
thereby requiring them to extend their criminal jurisdiction, such 
extension of jurisdiction in no way affects immunities under customary 
international law, including those of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. The 
Court emphasizes, however, that the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed 
by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they 
enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they might have committed, 
irrespective of their gravity. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar 
prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot 
exonerate the person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility. 
Accordingly, the immunities enjoyed under international law by an 
incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs do not represent a bar 
to criminal prosecution in certain circumstances. The Court refers to 
circumstances where such persons are tried in their own countries, where 
the State which they represent or have represented decides to waive that 
immunity, where such persons no longer enjoy all of the immunities 
accorded by international law in other States after ceasing to hold the 
office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, and where such persons are 
subject to criminal proceedings before certain international criminal 
courts, where they have jurisdiction. 
THE ISSUE AND CIRCULATION OF THE ARREST WARRANT OF 11 APRIL 
2000 (PARAS. 62-71) 
Given the conclusions it has reached above concerning the nature and 
scope of the rules governing the immunity from criminal jurisdiction 
enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, the Court then 
considers whether in the present case the issue of the arrest warrant of 11 
April 2000 and its international circulation violated those rules. The 
11
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Court recalls in this regard that the Congo requests it, in its first final 
submission, to adjudge and declare that: 
B]y issuing and internationally circulating the arrest warrant of 
11 April 2000 against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, 
Belgium committed a violation in regard to the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo of the rule of customary international law 
concerning the absolute inviolability and immunity from 
criminal process of incumbent foreign ministers; in so doing, it 
violated the principle of sovereign equality among States." 
After examining the terms of the arrest warrant, the Court notes that its 
issuance, as such, represents an act by the Belgian judicial authorities 
intended to enable the arrest on Belgian territory of an incumbent 
Minister for Foreign Affairs on charges of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. The fact that the warrant is enforceable is clearly apparent 
from the order given in it to "all bailiffs and agents of public authority ... 
to execute this arrest warrant" and from the assertion in the warrant that 
"the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs currently held by the 
accused does not entail immunity from jurisdiction and enforcement". 
The Court notes that the warrant did admittedly make an exception for 
the case of an official visit by Mr. Yerodia to Belgium, and that Mr. 
Yerodia never suffered arrest in Belgium. The Court considers itself 
bound, however, to find that, given the nature and purpose of the 
warrant, its mere issue violated the immunity which Mr. Yerodia enjoyed 
as the Congo's incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Court 
accordingly concludes that the issue of the warrant constituted a violation 
of an obligation of Belgium towards the Congo, in that it failed to respect 
the immunity of that Minister and, more particularly, infringed the 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability then enjoyed by 
him under international law. 
The Court also notes that Belgium admits that the purpose of the 
international circulation of the disputed arrest warrant was "to establish a 
legal basis for the arrest of Mr. Yerodia ... abroad and his subsequent 
extradition to Belgium". The Court finds that, as in the case of the 
warrant's issue, its international circulation from June 2000 by the 
Belgian authorities, given its nature and purpose, effectively infringed 
Mr. Yerodia's immunity as the Congo's incumbent Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and was furthermore liable to affect the Congo's conduct of its 
international relations. The Court concludes that the circulation of the 
warrant, whether or not it significantly interfered with Mr. Yerodia's 
diplomatic activity, constituted a violation of an obligation of Belgium 
12
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towards the Congo, in that it failed to respect the immunity of the 
incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo and, more 
particularly, infringed the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and 
inviolability then enjoyed by him under international law. 
REMEDIES (PARAS. 72-77) 
The Court then addresses the issue of the remedies sought by the Congo 
on account of Belgium's violation of the above-mentioned rules of 
international law. (Cf the second, third and fourth submissions of the 
Congo reproduced above). 
The Court observes that it has already concluded that the issue and 
circulation of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 by the Belgian 
authorities failed to respect the immunity of the incumbent Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the Congo and, more particularly, infringed the 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability then enjoyed by 
Mr. Yerodia under international law. Those acts engaged Belgium's 
international responsibility. The Court considers that the findings so 
reached by it constitute a form of satisfaction which will make good the 
moral injury complained of by the Congo. 
However, the Court goes on to observe that, as the Permanent Court of 
International Justice stated in its Judgment of 13 September 1928 in the 
case concerning the Factory at Chorz6w: 
"[t]he essential principle contained in the actual notion of an 
illegal act % a principle which seems to be established by 
international practice and in particular by the decisions of 
arbitral tribunals % is that reparation must, as far as possible, 
wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish 
the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that 
act had not been committed" (P.C.U., Series A, No. 17, p. 47). 
The Court finds that, in the present case, "the situation which would, in 
all probability, have existed if [the illegal act] had not been committed" 
cannot be re-established merely by a finding by the Court that the arrest 
warrant was unlawful under international law. The warrant is still extant, 
and remains unlawful, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Yerodia has 
ceased to be Minister for Foreign Mfairs. The Court accordingly 
considers that Belgium must, by means of its own choosing, cancel the 
warrant in question and so inform the authorities to whom it was 
circulated. 
13
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The Court sees no need for any further remedy: in particular, the Court 
points out that it cannot, in a judgment ruling on a dispute between the 
Congo and Belgium, indicate what that judgment's implications might be 
for third States, and the Court finds that it cannot therefore accept the 
Congo's submissions on this point. 
The full text of the operative paragraph (para. 78) reads as follows: 
"For these reasons, 
The Court, 
(1) (A) By fifteen votes to one, 
Rejects the objections of the Kingdom of Belgium relating to 
jurisdiction, mootness and admissibility; 
For: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shhi; Judges 
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, 
Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, 
Rezek, AI-Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Judges ad hoc 
Bula-Bula, Van den Wyngaert; 
Against: Judge Oda; 
(B) By fifteen votes to one, 
Finds that it has jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 17 October 2000; 
For: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges 
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, 
Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, 
Rezek, AI-Khasawneh, Buergentha1; Judges ad hoc 
Bula-Bula, Van den Wyngaert; 
Against: Judge Oda; 
(C) By fifteen votes to one, 
Finds that the Application of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo is not without object and that accordingly the case is not 
moot; 
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For: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges 
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, 
Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, 
Rezek, AI-Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Judges ad hoc 
Bula-Bula, Vanden Wyngaert; 
Against: Judge Oda; 
(D) By fifteen votes to one, 
Finds that the Application of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo is admissible; 
For: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges 
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, 
Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, 
Rezek, AI-Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Judges ad hoc 
Bula-Bula, Van den Wyngaert; 
Against: Judge Oda; 
(2) By thirteen votes to three, 
Finds that the issue against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi of 
the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000, and its international 
circulation, constituted violations of a legal obligation of the 
Kingdom of Belgium towards the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, in that they failed to respect the immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction and the inviolability which the incumbent Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
enjoyed under international law; 
For: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges 
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, 
Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, 
Rezek, Buergenthal; Judge ad hoc Bula-Bula; 
Against: Judges Oda, Al-Khasawneh; Judge ad hoc 
Van den Wyngaert; 
(3) By ten votes to six, 
165 
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Finds that the Kingdom of Belgium must, by means of its own 
choosing, cancel the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 and so 
inform the authorities to whom that warrant was circulated; 
For: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges 
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, 
Vereshchetin, Parra-Aranguren, Rezek; Judge ad hoc 
Bula-Bula; 
Against: Judges Oda, Higgins, Kooijmans, AI-
Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Judge ad hoc Van den 
Wyngaert." 
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE GUILLAUME, PRESIDENT 
In his separate opinion, President Guillaume subscribes to the Judgment 
of the Court and sets out his position on one question which the 
Judgment had not addressed: whether the Belgian judge has jurisdiction' 
to issue an international arrest warrant against Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi. 
He recalls that the primary aim of the criminal law is to enable 
punishment in each country of offences committed in the national 
territory. He adds that classic international law does not exclude a State's 
power in some cases to exercise its judicial jurisdiction over offences 
committed abroad, but he emphasizes that the exercise of that 
jurisdiction is not without its limits, as the Permanent Court stated in the 
"Lotus" case as long ago as 1927. 
He continues by making it clear that, under the law as classically 
formulated, a State normally has jurisdiction over an offence committed 
abroad only if the offender, or at the very least the victim, has the 
nationality of that State, or if the crime threatens its internal or external 
security. 
Additionally, States may exercise jurisdiction in cases of piracy and in 
the situation of subsidiary universal jurisdiction provided for by various 
conventions if the offender is present on their territory. However, apart 
from these cases, international law does not accept universal jurisdiction; 
still less does it accept universal jurisdiction in absentia. 
Thus, President Guillaume concludes that, if the Court had addressed 
these questions, it ought to have found that the Belgian judge was wrong 
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in holding himself competent to prosecute Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi by 
relying on a universal jurisdiction incompatible with international law. 
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ODA 
Judge Oda voted against all of the provisions of the operative part of the 
Court's Judgment in this case. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Oda 
stresses that the Court should have declared ex officio that it lacked 
jurisdiction to entertain the Congo's Application of 17 October 2000 
because there was at the time no legal dispute between the Parties of the 
kind required under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Court's Statute. In his 
dissenting opinion, Judge Oda reiterates the arguments he made in his 
declaration appended to the Court's Order of 8 December 2000 
concerning the request for indication of preliminary measures, and he 
addresses four main points. 
First, Judge Oda stresses that a belief by the Congo that the 1993 Belgian 
Law violated international law is not enough to create a legal dispute 
between the Parties. In its Application, the Congo asserted that 
Belgium's 1993 Law, as amended in 1999, concerning the Punishment of 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law ("the 1993 
Belgian Law"), contravenes international law. The Congo also argued 
that Belgium's prosecution of Mr. Yerodia, Foreign Minister of the 
Congo, violated the diplomatic immunity granted under international law 
to Ministers for Foreign Affairs. This argument was not supported by 
proof that Mr. Yerodia himself had suffered or would suffer anything 
more than some moral injury. Because of this, the case did not concern a 
legal dispute, but instead amounted to a request from the Congo for the 
Court to render a legal opinion on the lawfulness of the 1993 Belgian 
Law and actions taken under it. Judge Oda expresses grave concern that 
the Court's finding that there was a legal dispute could lead to an 
excessive number of cases being referred to the Court without any real 
injury being evidenced, a state of affairs which could cause States to 
withdraw their acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. 
Second, Judge Oda believes that the Congo changed the subject-matter 
of the proceedings between the time it filed its Application of 17 October 
2000 and submitted its Memorial on 15 May 2001. The questions the 
Congo originally raised - whether a State has extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over crimes amounting to serious violations of humanitarian 
law regardless of where they were committed and by whom, and whether 
a Foreign Minister is exempt from such jurisdiction - were transformed 
into questions concerning the issuance and international circulation of an 
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arrest warrant against a Foreign Minister and the immunities of 
incumbent Foreign Ministers. This transformation of the basic issues of 
the case, Judge Oda believes, did not come within the scope of the right 
the Congo reserved in its Application "to argue further the grounds of its 
Application". Judge Oda agrees with the Court's determination that the 
alleged dispute (which he does not agree was a legal dispute), was the 
one existing in October 2000, and he believes, therefore, that the Court 
was correct to reject Belgium's objections relating to "jurisdiction, 
mootness and admissibility". 
Third, Judge Oda turns to the question of whether the present case 
involves any legal issues on which the Congo and Belgium hold 
conflicting views. In response, he notes that the Congo appears to have 
abandoned its assertion, made in its Application, that the 1993 Belgian 
Law was itself contrary to the principle of sovereign equality under 
international law. In this regard, Judge Oda finds that extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction has been expanded in recent decades, and that 
universal jurisdiction is being increasingly recognized. Judge Oda 
believes that the Court wisely refrained from finding on this issue, since 
the law is not sufficiently developed in this area, and because the Court 
was not requested to take a decision on this point. Judge Oda also 
stresses his belief that the issuance and circulation of an arrest warrant, 
without any action concerning the warrant by third States, does not have 
any legal impact. Regarding diplomatic immunity, Judge Oda divides the 
question presented by this case into two main issues: first, whether in 
principle a Foreign Minister is entitled to the same immunity as 
diplomatic agents; and second, whether diplomatic immunity can be 
claimed in respect of serious breaches of humanitarian law. The Court, 
he indicates, has not sufficiently answered these questions, and should 
not have made the broad finding it appears to make, according Ministers 
for Foreign Affairs absolute immunity. 
Finally, Judge Oda believes that there is no practical significance to the 
Court's order that Belgium cancel the arrest warrant of April 2000, since 
Belgium can presumably issue a new arrest warrant against Mr. Yerodia 
as a former Minister for Foreign Affairs. If the Court believes that the 
sovereign dignity of the Congo was violated in 2000, the harm done 
cannot be remedied by the cancellation of the arrest warrant; the only 
remedy would be an apology by Belgium. For his part, Judge Oda does 
not believe that the Congo suffered any injury, since no action was ever 
taken against Mr. Yerodia pursuant to the warrant. In closing, Judge ada 
states that he finds the case "not only unripe for adjudication at this time 
but also fundamentally inappropriate for the Court's consideration". 
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DECLARA nON OF JUDGE RANJEV A 
In his declaration, Judge Ranjeva expresses agreement with both the 
operative part and the Court's approach in refraining from consideration 
of the issue of the merit of the extremely broad interpretation given to 
universal jurisdiction in absentia by the organs of the Belgian State. The 
withdrawal of the Congo's original first submission from its final 
submissions resulted in excluding universal jurisdiction from the scope 
of the claims. This change in the Applicant's litigation strategy obscured 
the heart of the problem underlying the present case as seen in the light 
of evolving opinion and international law concerning the suppression of 
the most heinous international crimes. The author points out that 
customary international law, as codified by the law of the sea 
conventions, recognizes one situation in which universal jurisdiction may 
be exercised: maritime piracy. The development of conventional law is 
marked by the gradual establishment of national courts' jurisdiction to 
punish, progressing as it has from the affmnation of the obligation to 
prevent and punish, without however establishing jurisdiction to punish, 
towards the enshrinement in treaty-made law of the principle aut judicare 
aut dedere. Judge Ranjeva finds Belgium's interpretation of the "Lotus" 
case, which in its view lays down the principle that jurisdiction exists in 
the absence of an explicit prohibition, to be unreasonable given the facts 
and circumstances of the case on which the Permanent Court of 
International Justice was called to adjudicate. Judge Ranjeva is of the 
opinion that, leaving aside the compelling obligation to give effect to the 
punishment and prevention called for by international law and without it 
being necessary to condemn the Belgian Law, it would have been 
difficult under current positive law not to uphold the Congo's original 
first submission. 
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE KOROMA 
In his separate opinion, Judge Koroma stated that the choice of technique 
or method of responding to the final submissions put to the Court by the 
Parties is the prerogative of the Court so long as the Judgment provides a 
complete answer to the submissions. On the other hand, in the context of 
the present case, the Court decided not to engage in a legal discourse or 
exegesis to reach its conclusion, since it did not consider it necessary, 
interesting though it may have been. The Judgment cannot therefore be 
juridically queried on this ground. 
Judge Koroma maintained that the Court was entitled, in responding to 
submissions, to take as its point of departure the determination of 
whether international law permits an exemption of immunity from the 
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jurisdiction of an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs without delving 
into the issue of universal jurisdiction, particularly as both Parties had 
relinquished " the issue and had asked the Court to pronounce on it only in 
so far as it relates to the question of the immunity of a Foreign Minister 
in office. Thus, in his view, and despite appearances to the contrary, what 
the Court is called upon to decide is not which of the principles of either 
immunity or universal jurisdiction is pre-eminent, but rather whether the 
issue and circulation of the warrant violated the immunity of a Foreign 
Minister in office. Judge Koroma pointed out that jurisdiction and 
immunity are different concepts. 
According to him, the method chosen by the Court is also justified on 
practical grounds; in that the arrest warrant had been issued in Belgium 
on the basis of Belgian law, it was therefore appropriate for the Court to 
determine the impact of that law on an incumbent Foreign Minister. The 
Court has ruled that while Belgium is entitled to initiate criminal 
proceedings against anyone in its jurisdiction, this did not extend to an 
incumbent Foreign Minister of a foreign State who is immune from such 
jurisdiction. In the Judge's opinion, the Judgment should be seen as 
responding to that issue, the paramount legal justification for which is 
that a Foreign Minister's immunity is not only of functional necessity but 
increasingly nowadays he or she represents the State, even though this 
position is not assimilable to that of Head of State. However, in the 
Judge's view, the Judgment should not be considered either as a 
validation or a rejection of the principle of universal jurisdiction, 
particularly when no such submission was before the Court. 
On the other hand, the Judge stated that, by issuing and circulating the 
warrant, Belgium had demonstrated how seriously it took its 
international obligation to combat international crimes, yet it is 
unfortunate that the wrong case would appear to have been chosen to do 
this. It is his opinion that today, together with piracy, universal 
jurisdiction is available for certain crimes" such as war crimes, crimes 
against humanity including the slave trade and genocide. 
Finally, on the issue of remedies, Judge Koroma considered that the 
Court's instruction to Belgium to cancel the arrest warrant should repair 
the moral injury suffered by the Congo and restore the situation status 
quo ante before the warrant was issued and circulated. This should 
restore legal peace between the Parties. 
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JOINT SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGES HIGGINS, KOOIJMANS AND 
BUERGENTHAL 
171 
In their joint separate opinion, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and 
Buergenthal agree with the Court's holding on jurisdiction and 
admissibility, and with much of what the Court has to say regarding 
immunities of incumbent Foreign Ministers. They consider, however, 
that the Court should also have addressed the issue of universal 
jurisdiction since the issue of immunities depends, conceptually, upon a 
pre-existing jurisdiction. The ultra petita rule bars only a ruling on 
universal jurisdiction in the dispositif, not its elucidation. Such 
elucidation was necessary because immunities and universal jurisdiction 
are closely interrelated in this case and bear on the maintenance of 
stability in international relations without perpetuating impunity for 
international crimes. 
Turning to universal jurisdiction, Judges Higgins, Kooijrnans and 
Buergenthal ask whether States are entitled to exercise such jurisdiction 
over persons accused of serious international crimes who have no 
connection with the forum State and are not present in the State's 
territory. Although they find no established practice indicating the 
exercise of such jurisdiction, neither do they find evidence of an opinio 
juris that deems it illegal. Moreover, the growing number of multilateral 
treaties for the punishment of serious international crimes tend to be 
drafted with great care so as not to preclude the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction by national courts in these type of cases. Thus, while there 
may be no general rule specifically authorizing the right to exercise 
universal jurisdiction, the absence of a prohibitive rule and the growing 
international consensus on the need to punish crimes regarded as most 
heinous by the international community, indicate that the warrant for the 
arrest of Mr. Yerodia did not as such violate international law. 
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal agree in general with the 
Court's finding regarding Mr. Yerodia's immunity. They share the 
Court's view that the immunity of a Foreign Minister must not be 
equated with impunity and that procedural immunity cannot shield the 
Minister from personal responsibility once the Minister is no longer in 
office. However, they consider as too expansive the scope of the 
immunities the Court attributes to Foreign Ministers and too restrictive 
the limits it appears to impose on the scope of the personal responsibility 
of such officials and where they may be tried. In their view, serious 
crimes under international law engage the personal responsibility of high 
State officials. For purposes of immunities, the concept of official acts 
must be narrowly defined. 
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Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal voted against the Court's 
finding in paragraph (3) of the dispositif that Belgium must cancel the 
arrest warrant. They consider that the Court's reliance on the dictum in 
the Factory at ChorzUw case is misplaced because the restoration of the 
status quo ante is not possible as Mr. Yerodia is no longer Foreign 
Minister. Moreover, since Mr. Yerodia no longer holds this office, the 
illegality attaching to the warrant ceased and with it the continuing 
illegality that would justify an order for its withdrawal. 
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE REZEK 
Judge Rezek voted in favour of all paragraphs of the operative part of the 
Judgment. He nonetheless regrets that the Court did not rule on the issue 
of the jurisdiction of the Belgian courts. The fact that the Congo confined 
itself to inviting the Court to render a decision based on immunity does 
not justify, in Judge Rezek's view, the Court's dropping of what 
represents an inevitable logical premise to the examination of the issue of 
immunity. 
Judge Rezek considers that an examination of international law 
demonstrates that, as it currently stands, that law does not permit the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction by domestic courts in the absence of 
some connecting circumstance with the forum State. A fortiori, it follows 
that Belgium cannot be considered as having been "obliged" to institute 
criminal proceedings in this case. Judge Rezek notes in particular that the 
Geneva Conventions do not enshrine any notion of universal jurisdiction 
in absentia, and that such jurisdiction has never been claimed by the 
Spanish courts in the Pinochet case. 
Judge Rezek concludes by noting the importance of restraint in the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction by domestic courts; a restraint in line 
with the notion of a decentralized international community, founded on 
the principle of the equality of its members and necessarily requiring 
mutual co-ordination. 
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AL-KHASA WNEH 
Judge AI-Khasawneh dissented because, in his opmlOn, incumbent 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs enjoy only limited immunity, i.e., 
immunity from enforcement when on an official mission. He arrived at 
this conclusion on the bases that: immunity is an exception to the rule 
that man is legally and morally responsible for his actions and should 
therefore be construed narrowly; that unlike diplomats, the immunities of 
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Foreign Ministers. are not clear in terms of their basis or extent and 
unlike Heads of State, Foreign Ministers do not personify the State and 
are therefore not entitled to immunities and privileges attaching to their 
person. While the Belgian warrant went beyond jurisdiction, it contained 
express language regarding unenforceability if the Minister was on 
Belgian soil on official mission, similarly the circulation of the warrant 
was not accompanied re while Mr. Yerodia was still in office re by a Red 
Notice asking other States to take enforcement steps. 
Judge AI-Khasawneh also dealt with the question of exceptions in the 
case of high-ranking State officials accused of grave crimes from the 
protection afforded by immunities. In this regard he felt that the morally 
embarrassing problem of impunity was not adequately dealt with in the 
Judgment which tried to circumvent the problem by an artificial 
distinction between "procedural immunity" on the one hand and 
"substantive immunity" on the other, and by postulating four situations 
where immunity and impunity would not be synonymous, i.e., (a) 
prosecution in the home State, (b) waiver and (c) prosecution after 
leaving office, except for official acts and (d) before international courts. 
Having considered these four situations he nevertheless felt that a lacuna 
still existed. Lastly, he argued that the need for effective combating of 
grave crimes - recognized as such by the international community -
represents a higher norm than the rules on immunity and in case of 
conflict should prevail, even if one is to speak of reconciliation of 
opposing norms and not of the triumph of one over the other, this would 
suggest a more restrictive approach to immunity - which would 
incidentally bring immunity from criminal process into consonance with 
the now firmly established regime of restrictive immunities of States -
than the Judgment portrays. 
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE BULA-BuLA 
By conducting itself unlawfully, the Kingdom of Belgium, a sovereign 
State, committed an internationally wrongful act to the detriment of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, likewise a sovereign State. 
Judge Bula-Bula fully supports the decision of the Court, which upholds 
the rule of law against the law of the jungle. In this regard, he has also 
indicated other grounds of fact and law which will render further 
substance to a Judgment of interest to the entire international community. 
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DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE V AN DEN WYNGAERT 
Judge Van den Wyngaert has voted against the Court's decision on the 
merits. She disagrees with the Court's conclusion that there is a rule of 
customary international law granting immunity to incumbent Foreign 
Ministers. She believes that Belgium has not violated a legal obligation it 
owed in this respect to the Congo. Even assuming, arguendo, that there 
was such a rule, there was no violation in the present case as the warrant 
could not be and was not executed, neither in the country where it was 
issued (Belgium) nor in the countries to which it was circulated: The 
warrant was not an "international arrest warrant" in a legal sense: it could 
and did not have this effect, neither in Belgium nor in third countries. 
Judge Van den Wyngaert believes that these are the only objective 
elements the Court should have looked at. The subjective elements, i.e., 
whether the warrant had a psychological effect on Mr. Yerodia or 
whether it was perceived as offensive by the Congo (cf. the terms iniuria 
and capitis diminutio used by counsel for the Congo) was irrelevant for 
the dispute. 
On the subject of immunities, Judge Van den Wyngaert finds no legal 
basis under international law for granting immunity to an incumbent 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. There is no conventional international law 
on the subject. There is no customary international law on the subject 
either. Before reaching the conclusion that Ministers for Foreign Affairs 
enjoy a full immunity from foreign jurisdiction under customary 
international law, the International Court of Justice should have satisfied 
itself of the existence of State practice (usus) and opinio juris 
establishing an international custom to this effect. A "negative" practice, 
consisting in their abstaining from instituting criminal proceedings, 
cannot, in itself, be seen as evidence for an opinio juris ("Lotus", 
Judgment No.9, 1927, P.C.U., Series A, No. 10, p. 28), and abstinence 
can be attributed to many other factors, including practical and political 
considerations. Legal opinion does not support the Court's proposition 
that Ministers for Foreign Affairs are immune from the jurisdiction of 
other States under customary international law. Moreover, the Court 
reaches this conclusion without regard to the general tendency toward the 
restriction of immunity of the State officials (including even Heads of 
State), not only in the field of private and commercial law but also in the 
field of criminal law, when there are allegations of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. Belgium may have acted contrary to 
international comity, but it has not infringed international law. Judge Van 
den Wyngaert therefore believes that the whole Judgment is based on 
flawed reasoning. 
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On the subject of (universal) jurisdiction, on which the Court did not 
pronounce itself in the present Judgment, Judge Van den Wyngaert 
believes that Belgium was perfectly entitled to apply its legislation to the 
war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed by Mr. 
Yerodia in the Congo. Belgium's War Crimes Act, giving effect to the 
principle of universal jurisdiction regarding war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, is not contrary to international law. On the contrary, 
international law permits and even encourages States to assert this form 
of jurisdiction in order to ensure that suspects of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity do not find safe havens. Universal jurisdiction is not 
contrary to the principle of complementarity in the Rome Statute for an 
International Criminal Court. The International Criminal Court will only 
be able to act if States that have jurisdiction are unwilling or unable 
genuinely to carry out investigation or prosecution (Art. 17). And even 
where such willingness exists, the International Criminal Court, like the 
ad hoc international tribunals, will not be able to deal with all crimes that 
come under its jurisdiction. The International Criminal Court will not 
have the capacity for that, and there will always be a need for States to 
investigate and prosecute core crimes. These States include, but are not 
limited to, national and territorial States. Especially in the case of sham 
trials, there will still be a need for third States to investigate and 
prosecute. 
This case was to be a test case, probably the first opportunity for the 
International Court of Justice to address a number of questions that have 
not been considered since the famous "Lotus" case of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice in 1927. In technical terms, the dispute was 
about an arrest warrant against an incumbent Foreign Minister. The 
warrant was, however, based on charges of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, which the Court even fails to mention in the dispositif. 
In a more principled way, the case was about how far States can or must 
go when implementing modem international criminal law. It was about 
the question what international law requires or allows States to do as 
"agents" of the international community when they are confronted with 
complaints of victims of such crimes, given the fact that international 
criminal courts will not be able to judge all international crimes. It was 
about balancing two divergent interests in modem international 
(criminal) law: the need of international accountability for such crimes as 
torture, terrorism, war crimes and crimes against humanity and the 
principle of sovereign equality of States, which presupposes a system of 
immunities. 
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Judge Van den Wyngaert regrets that the Court has not addressed the 
dispute from this perspective and has instead focused on the very narrow 
technical question of immunities for incumbent Foreign Ministers. In 
failing to address the dispute from a more principled perspective, the 
International Court of Justice has missed an excellent opportunity to 
contribute to the development of modem international criminal law. In 
legal doctrine, there is a plethora of recent scholarly writings on the 
subject. Major scholarly organizations and non-governmental 
organizations have taken clear positions on the subject of international 
accountability. The latter may be seen as the opinion of civil society, an 
opinion that cannot be completely discounted in the formation of 
customary international law today. She highly regrets that the Court fails 
to acknowledge this development, and instead adopts a formalistic 
reasoning, examining whether there is, under customary international 
law, an international crimes exception to the re wrongly postulated re rule 
of immunity for incumbent Ministers under customary international law. 
By adopting this approach, the Court implicitly establishes a hierarchy 
between the rules on immunity (protecting incumbent former Ministers) 
and the rules on international accountability (calling for the investigation 
of charges against incumbent Foreign Ministers suspected of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity). By elevating the former rules to the level 
of customary international law in the fIrst part of its reasoning, and 
fInding that the latter have failed to reach the same status in the second 
part of its reasoning, the Court does not need to give further 
consideration to the legal status of the principle of international 
accountability under international law. Other courts, for example, the 
House of Lords in the Pinochet case and the European Court of Human 
Rights in the AI-Adsani case have given more thought and consideration 
to the balancing of the relative normative status of international ius 
cogens crimes and immunities. 
Judge Van den Wyngaert disagrees with the Court's proposition that 
immunity does not lead to impunity of incumbent Foreign Ministers. 
This may be true in theory, but not in practice. It is, in theory, true that an 
incumbent or former Foreign Minister can always be prosecuted in his 
own country or in other States if the State whom he represents waves 
immunity, as the Court asserts. However, this is precisely the core of the 
problem of impunity: where national authorities are not willing or able to 
investigate or prosecute, the crime goes unpunished. And this is what 
happened in the present case. The Congo accused Belgium of exercising 
universal jurisdiction in absentia against an incumbent Foreign Minister, 
but it had itself omitted to exercise its jurisdiction in presentia in the case 
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of Mr. Yerodia, thus infringing the Geneva Conventions and not 
complying with a host of United Nations resolutions to this effect. The 
Congo did not come to the Court with clean hands: it blamed Belgium 
for investigating and prosecuting allegations of international crimes that 
it was obliged to investigate and prosecute itself. 
In addition, Judge Van den Wyngaert finds the Judgment highly 
unsatisfactory where it states that immunity does not lead to impunity of 
former Foreign Ministers: according to the Court, the lifting of full 
immunity, in this case, is only for acts committed prior or subsequent to 
his or her period of office and for acts committed during that period of 
office in a private capacity. Whether war crimes and crimes against 
humanity fall into this category the Court does not say. Judge Van den 
Wyngaert finds it extremely regrettable that the International Court of 
Justice has not, like the House of Lords in the Pinochet case, qualified 
this statement. It could and indeed should have added that war crimes 
and crimes against humanity can never fall into this category. Some 
crimes under international law (e.g., certain acts of genocide and of 
aggression) can, for practical purposes, only be committed with the 
means and mechanisms of a State and as part of a State policy. They 
cannot, from that perspective, be anything other than "official" acts. 
Immunity should never apply to crimes under international law, neither 
before international courts nor national courts. 
Victims of such violations bringing legal action against such persons in 
third States would face the obstacle of immunity from jurisdiction. 
Today, they may, by virtue of the application of the 1969 Special 
Missions Convention, face the obstacle of immunity from execution 
while the Minister is on an official visit, but they would not be barred 
from bringing an action altogether. Judge Van den Wyngaert feels that 
taking immunities further than this may even lead to conflict with 
international human rights rules, particularly the right of access to court, 
as appears from the recent Al-Adsani case of the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
According to Judge Van den Wyngaert, an implicit consideration behind 
this Judgment may have been a concern for abuse and chaos, arising 
from the risk of States asserting unbridled universal jurisdiction and 
engaging in abusive. prosecutions against incumbent Foreign Ministers of 
other States and thus paralysing the functioning of these States. In the 
present dispute, however, there was no allegation of abuse of process on 
the part of Belgium. Criminal proceedings against Mr. Yerodia were not 
frivolous or abusive. The warrant was issued after two years of criminal 
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investigations and there were no allegations that the investigating judge 
who issued it acted on false factual evidence. The accusation that 
Belgium applied its War Crimes Statute in an offensive and 
discriminatory manner against a Congolese Foreign Minister was 
manifestly ill-founded. Belgium, rightly or wrongly, wishes to act as an 
agent of the world community by allowing complaints brought by· 
foreign victims of serious human rights abuses committed abroad. Since 
the infamous Dutroux case (a case of child molestation attracting great 
media attention in the late 1990s), Belgium has amended its laws in order 
to improve victims' procedural rights, without discriminating between 
Belgian and foreign victims. In doing so, Belgium has also opened its 
courts to victims bringing charges based on war crimes and crimes 
against humanity committed abroad. This new legislation has been 
applied, not only in the case against Mr. Yerodia but also in cases against 
Mr. Pinochet, Mr. Sharon, Mr. Rafzanjani, Mr. Hissen HabrE, Mr. Fidel 
Castro, etc. It would therefore be wrong to say that the War Crimes 
Statute has been applied against a Congolese national in a discriminatory 
way. 
In the abstract, the chaos argument may be pertinent. This risk may exist, 
and the Court could have legitimately warned against it in its Judgment 
without necessarily reaching the conclusion that a rule of customary 
international law exists to the effect of granting immunity to Foreign 
Ministers. Judge Van den Wyngaert observes that granting immunities to 
incumbent Foreign Ministers may open the door to other sorts of abuse. 
It dramatically increases the number of persons that enjoy international 
immunity from jurisdiction. Recognizing immunities for other members 
of government is just one step further: in present-day society, all cabinet 
members represent their countries in various meetings. If Foreign 
Ministers need immunities to perform their functions, why not grant 
immunities to other cabinet members as well? The International Court of 
Justice does not state this, but doesn't this flow from its reasoning 
leading to the conclusion that Foreign Ministers are immune? The 
rationale for assimilating Foreign Ministers with diplomatic agents and 
Heads of State, which is at the centre of the Court's reasoning, also exists 
for other Ministers who represent the State officially, for example, 
Ministers of Education who have to attend UNESCO conferences in New 
York or other Ministers receiving honorary doctorates abroad. Male fide 
governments may appoint persons to cabinet posts in order to shelter 
them from prosecutions on charges of international crimes. 
Judge Van den Wyngaert concludes by saying that the International 
Court of Justice, in its effort to close one box of Pandora for fear of 
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chaos and abuse, may have opened another one: that of granting 
immunity and thus de facto impunity to an increasing number of 
government officials. 
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